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Note
Enforcing the One-Subject Rule: The Case for a
Subject Veto
The legislative practices of "logrolling" and attaching "riders"' to
important bills are well-known and long-criticized aspects of the Ameri-
can legislative process.2 These practices facilitate "pork barrel" legisla-
tion which establishes unnecessary programs that benefit a small group,
usually a particular legislator's constituency.3 These practices are criti-
cized because they permit the enactment in "omnibus legislation" of
measures that, standing alone, are incapable of commanding the support
of the legislature.4 In addition, legislatures sometimes use both riders
and logrolling to render the executive veto power ineffective.
While these practices occur on both the federal and state levels, the
states have made the greatest efforts to curb them. These efforts consist
primarily of two devices not present in the federal legislative process.5
The first is the one-subject rule, which restricts the legislature from in-
1. Logrolling is the "legislative practice of embracing in one bill several distinct matters,
none of which, perhaps, could singly obtain the assent of the legislature, and then procuring its
passage by a combination of the minorities in favor of each of the measures into a majority that
will adopt them all." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 849 (5th ed. 1979).
A rider is a nongermane amendment to a bill that appears destined for passage. Its pur-
pose often is to "veto-proof" the measure. Because the main bill may be desirable or even
crucial legislation, the chief executive often is forced to sign the rider into law, even though he
or she might have vetoed the provision if it stood alone. W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, THE AMERI-
CAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 210 (6th ed. 1985). Although riders are most commonly attached
to appropriation bills, they are sometimes added to other important legislation. B. GROSS,
THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE 221 (1953).
2. E.g., R. LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 356 (1935) [hereinafter R. LUCE,
PROBLEMS]; R. LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 542-44, 548-52 (1922) [hereinafter R. LUCE,
PROCEDURE]; Note, The Legislative Rider and the Veto Power, 26 GEO. L.J. 954 (1938).
3. J. PLANO & M. GREENBERG, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY 218 (7th ed.
1985).
4. See, e.g., Ruud, "No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject", 42 MINN. L.
REV. 389, 448 (1958). Omnibus legislation refers to a "bill including in one act various sepa-
rate and distinct matters, and frequently one joining a number of different subjects in one
measure in such a way as to compel the executive authority to accept provisions which he does
not approve or else defeat the whole enactment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 980-81 (5th ed.
1979). One of the most notorious examples of omnibus legislation is the so-called "Christmas
Tree" bill passed by Congress in 1966, to which 49 irrelevant measures were attached. D.
PEARSON & J. ANDERSON, THE CASE AGAINST CONGRESS 322 (1968).
5. The United States Constitution places no limitation on the drafting of legislation, so
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eluding more than one subject in a bill.6 The second is the item veto,
which enables the governor to strike "items" from appropriation bills.7
As a practical matter, however, these devices do not prevent state
legislatures from engaging in logrolling or using riders. Political pressure
and judicial deference to the legislature combine to limit the efficacy of
the one-subject rule in curbing these activities. Similarly, the item veto,
depending on the jurisdiction, is of limited value partly because it gener-
ally applies only to appropriation bills and partly because many courts
read the word "item" narrowly.
These shortcomings raise the issue of whether the one-subject rule
and item veto presently produce the legislative-executive balance of
power intended by their drafters. In other words, regardless of the in-
dependent desirability of these two devices, the question remains whether
the courts are applying them in a manner consistent with the overall state
legislative process. This Note contends that they are not. Accordingly,
the Note proposes judicial recognition of a gubernatorial "subject veto"
power. Such a power would enable governors in states with a one-sub-
ject rule to disapprove segments of any bill, provided the portion vetoed
comprises a separate, nongermane subject, discrete from the rest of the
bill. The subject veto would distribute power between the legislative and
executive branches in accordance with the purposes of the one-subject
rule and the item veto.
Much of the discussion in this Note applies to all states that have
adopted some form of the one-subject rule. However, it will focus on a
few illustrative judicial decisions and California law in particular, since
the California Supreme Court is currently considering a case which
presents such an issue.8 Even among states with a one-subject rule, dif-
ferences in language and interpretations exist, and the Note accordingly
discusses and compares some of the more significant differences.
Because the issue is not simply a legal one, but also one of state
political philosophy, the Note briefly reviews both the historical and legal
background and purposes underlying the one-subject rule and the guber-
natorial veto power. Section I discusses the foundations of the one-sub-
omnibus bills are relatively common. In addition, the Constitution gives the President no
item-veto power over appropriation legislation.
6. See generally Ruud, supra note 4.
7. See generally J. KALLENBACH, THE AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE 361-77 (1966);
Fairlie, The Veto Power of the State Governor, 11 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 473 (1917); Prescott, The
Executive Veto in American States, 3 W. POL. Q. 98 (1950). The precise definition of an item
of appropriation is a matter of considerable controversy. As a general rule, however, an item is
an allocation of money for a particular purpose. Thus, it consists of two parts: a sum of
money and instructions for its expenditure. See infra text accompanying notes 79-129.
8. Harbor v. Deukmejian, 176 Cal. App. 3d 813, 222 Cal. Rptr. 382, review granted,
Apr. 3, 1986 (S.F. 24837), reprinted without change to permit tracking pending review, 185 Cal.
App. 3d 299 (1986); see supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
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ject rule and the development of executive power to disapprove
legislation. Section II analyzes several judicial decisions interpreting the
one-subject rule and the item veto. Finally, section III proposes the sub-
ject veto and considers some potential rationales and objections regard-
ing such a device.
I. The One-Subject Rule and the Gubernatorial Veto Power
A. The One-Subject Rule
Objections to combining unrelated matters in one bill certainly are
not new. Indeed, ancient Rome banned the practice. 9 In the political
history of the United States, efforts by state governments to curb such
activity have become increasingly common. Although none of the origi-
nal thirteen states prohibited omnibus legislation, the one-subject rule
had gained widespread acceptance by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. 10 At present, forty-one states have some form of constitutional one-
subject rule.1 California's version, which is substantially similar to the
rule in other states, reads: "A statute shall embrace but one subject,
which shall be expressed in its title .... ,"2 The specific language of
other state constitutions sometimes differs, but these differences rarely
affect the rule's operation.' 3
Courts and commentators offer several reasons for the one-subject
rule, including the prevention of deception14 and the preservation of an
orderly legislative process.' 5 But these rationales are secondary to the
rule's main focus. According to Professor Ruud, "[t]he primary and uni-
9. Ruud, supra note 4, at 389.
10. Id. at 389-90.
11. Id. at 389. The nine states without a one-subject rule are Arkansas, Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Wisconsin.
12. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9. In most states, the unity of subject matter requirement is
linked to a provision requiring that each bill contain a title expressing the subject matter of the
bill. The title rule is a distinct requirement, differing in function and purpose from the one-
subject rule. "The primary purpose of the title requirement is to prevent surprise and fraud
upon the people and the legislature." Ruud, supra note 4, at 392.
13. A few states-Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, West Virginia, and Virginia-limit
bills to one "object." Some courts have interpreted "object" to mean the "aim" or "purpose"
of the bill. See, e.g., Pinder v. Board of Supervisors, 146 So. 715, 718 (La. App. 1933); Kent
County ex rel. Board of Supervisors v. Reed, 243 Mich. 120, 123, 219 N.W. 656, 657 (1928).
There is no indication, however, that the differing language has resulted in differing construc-
tions by the courts. For instance, the Indiana Supreme Court stated that "[w]hile the 'object'
of an act may not be interchangeable with 'subject,' still we think the object of an act must be
considered in determining whether matters embraced in the act may be reasonably treated as
one 'subject.'" State ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel, 203 Ind. 457, 469, 180 N.E. 865, 868 (1932).
14. People ex rel. Chapman v. Sacramento Drainage Dist., 155 Cal. 373, 385, 103 P. 207,
213 (1909).
15. Ruud, supra note 4, at 391.
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versally recognized purpose of the one-subject rule is to prevent log-roll-
ing in the enactment of laws." 16  Virtually all of the forty-one
jurisdictions report cases that identify logrolling-sometimes called "om-
nibus legislation"-as the evil to be remedied by the one-subject rule.
17
A California appellate court recently reiterated the prevention of
logrolling as the primary basis for the one-subject rule. In Planned
Parenthood Affiliates v. Swoap, 18 the court identified two purposes behind
the one-subject rule of the California Constitution, but emphasized the
logrolling rationale:
One of its functions "is to prevent legislators and the public from being
entrapped by misleading titles to bills whereby legislation relating to
one subject might be obtained under the title of another." But preven-
tion of the passage of acts bearing misleading titles is not the principal
purpose of the one-subject rule. As has been stated, "[t]he primary
and universally recognized purpose... is to prevent logrolling in the
enactment of laws ...."19
The Swoap court's emphasis on this aspect of the rule is especially
appropriate in light of the rule's history. California's first constitution,
ratified in 1849, included a one-subject rule.20 Although the constitu-
tional convention of 1849 adopted the measure without debate, 21 the del-
egates to the second constitutional convention, which occurred in 1878-
79, did discuss the rule prior to including it in the new constitution. 22
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Department of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455,459 (Fla. 1982); Fuehrmeyer
v. City of Chicago, 57 11. 2d 193, 201, 311 N.E.2d 116, 121 (1974); State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste,
11 Ohio St. 3d 141, 142, 464 N.E.2d 153, 155 (1984); Booth & Flinn, Ltd. v. Miller, 237 Pa.
297, 302, 85 A. 457,458 (1912); Washington Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, 49 Wash. 2d 520, 525,
304 P.2d 676, 679 (1956).
18. 173 Cal. App. 3d 1187, 219 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1985).
19. Id. at 1196, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 669-70 (quoting Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226, 228, 24 P.
383, 383 (1890), and Ruud, supra note 4, at 391) (citations omitted).
20. In the constitution of 1849, the one-subject rule was embodied in article IV, § 25,
which read:
Every law enacted by the legislature, shall embrace but one object, and that shall be
expressed in the title: and no law shall be revised, or amended, by reference to its
title; but in such case, the act revised, or section amended shall be re-enacted and
published at length.
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 25 (1849).
21. J. Ross BROWN, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA,
ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849, at
90 (1850).
22. 2 E.B. WILLIS & P.K. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, IN SEPTEMBER, 1878, at 796-803
(1881). The language of the provision in the 1879 constitution differed from the earlier section
and included an additional measure:
Every Act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be expressed in its title.
But if any subject shall be embraced in an Act which shall not be expressed in its
title, such Act shall-be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in its
title. No law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title; but in such case the
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Delegates offered several rationales for the provision, but the prevention
of logrolling was foremost among them. One delegate succinctly stated
the rule's purpose: "I suppose everybody understands that the object of
the provision is to prevent collusion in a legislative body; to prevent the
passage of what are called omnibus bills-uniting various interests in or-
der to get them passed."' 23 Perhaps even more significant, however, was
another delegate's recognition that this rule represented a rejection of the
federal system. "[Logrolling] is the way legislation takes place in the
Congress of the United States, and accounts for the vicious legislation
which takes place there .... Now, if we should take this clause out
altogether, it would open legislation here to the same rule."'24 This ex-
plicit repudiation of the federal approach to legislation suggests that the
drafters of the one-subject rule aimed it not only at legislative collusion,
but also at the evil of legislative circumvention of the gubernatorial veto.
This conclusion is reinforced by judicial decisions observing that
riders, as well as logrolling, are a target of the one-subject rule.25 Legis-
latures use riders not only to garner votes, but also as a weapon to pre-
clude a veto of measures objectionable to the executive.26 A number of
jurisdictions have explicitly acknowledged that the prevention of "veto-
proofing" is a central function of the prohibition on multiple subjects.
27
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated this point clearly early in this
century:
[B]y joining a number of different subjects in one bill the governor was
put under compulsion to accept some enactments that he could not
approve, or to defeat the whole, including others that he thought desir-
act revised or section amended shall be re-enacted and published at length as revised
or amended; and all laws of the State of California, and all official writings, and the
executive, legislative, and judicial proceedings, shall be conducted, preserved, and
published in no other than the English language.
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (1879).
In 1966, the California Constitutional Revision Commission moved the rule to section 9
and changed it to its present form, deleting the last clause as "obsolete." CAL. CONSTITU-
TIONAL REVISION COMM'N, PROPOSED REVISION OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION 34
(1966).
23. 2 E.B. WILLIS & P.K. STOCKTON, supra note 22, at 798.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Exparte Hallawell, 155 Cal. 112, 99 P. 490 (1909); Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151
(1854); Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). Professor Ruud recognizes
this function, yet dismisses it as "but a variation of logrolling." Ruud, supra note 4, at 391.
However, some courts have defined "logrolling" as an attempt to veto-proof legislation. See,
e.g., Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654, 663-64 (Fla. 1980).
26. "By far the most important function of riders ... is the enhancement of Congress'
bargaining position vis-A-vis the President, for the rider necessarily circumvents to some degree
the President's veto power." Note, Separation of Powers: Congressional Riders and the Veto
Power, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 735, 740 (1973).
27. See, e.g., Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654, 663-64 (Fla. 1980); Green v. Rawls, 122
So. 2d 10, 13 (Fla. 1960); Turner v. Wright, 11111. 2d 161, 172, 142 N.E.2d 84, 90 (1957); State
ex rel. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 314, 260 N.W. 486, 492 (1935).
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able or even necessary. Such bills, popularly called "omnibus bills,"
became a crying evil .... Omnibus bills were done away with by the
amendment of 1864 that no bill shall contain more than one subject,
which shall be clearly expressed in the title.
28
While California courts have yet to acknowledge the veto-proofing
rationale explicitly, they do recognize that riders are a target of the one-
subject rule.29 Whether the legislative abuse to be remedied is termed
"logrolling" or "riders," it is clear that protection of the governor's veto
power is among the main purposes of the one-subject rule. Indeed, such
protection is an obvious and significant benefit of the rule.
B. The Gubernatorial Veto Power
(1) The General Veto
At present, every state except North Carolina provides the governor
with the power to disapprove legislation. 30 Quite the contrary was true,
however, early in the history of the United States. British rule had in-
stilled in the colonists a pervasive fear of executive power. Among the
causes of the American Revolution was the veto power held and some-
times abused by both the colonial governors and the King.31 Indeed, the
first example of royal mistreatment of the colonies listed in the Declara-
tion of Independence was the oppressive use of the veto:
He [the King] has refused his Assent to Laws, the most whole-
some and necessary for the public good.
He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and
pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent
should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to
attend to them.
32
Abuse of the veto power was not forgotten when the newly in-
dependent states began drafting constitutions. 33 Only two of the original
thirteen states, New York and Massachusetts, included even a qualified
veto power in their initial constitutions, adopted in 1777 and 1780, re-
spectively.34 By the time of the federal constitutional convention, how-
28. Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 171-72, 48 A. 976,
977 (1901).
29. E.g., Exparte Hallawell, 155 Cal. 112, 114, 99 P. 490, 492 (1909).
30. B. SAcHs, LAWS, LEGISLATURE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: A FIFTY STATE INDEX
99 (1982). As of the writing of this Note, the Sachs index remained accurate.
31. E. MASON, THE VETO POWER 17-18 (1890); see also J. KALLENBACH, supra note 7,
at 22.
32. The Declaration of Independence paras. 3-4 (U.S. 1776).
33. "Conflict between colonial assemblies and governors had brought into clear view cer-
tain elements of the executive power which it was thought necessary to restrict or to assign to
the legislative branch. Above all, it had brought into disfavor the colonial governor's powers
of prorogation, dissolution, and veto .... " J. KALLENBACH, supra note 7, at 11.
34. R. LUCE, PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 145-49. South Carolina initially included an
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
ONE-SUBJECT RULE
ever, sentiment had changed. 35 Alexander Hamilton36 and James
Madison 37 championed the cause of increased executive power. This
new perspective resulted in a qualified presidential veto power.
38
Within a century, suspicion of the executive had been replaced by
hostility toward the legislature.39 "The transition from early state consti-
tutions granting unfettered legislative power to the more recent constitu-
tions restricting legislative power reflects one of the most important
themes in state constitutional law."4° With the decline in confidence in
the legislature, executive power correspondingly increased. By 1812,
nearly half the states had adopted a gubernatorial veto power; by 1860,
twenty-two of thirty-three governors had the veto; and by 1900, these
numbers had increased to forty-two of forty-three.
41
In addition, since the late nineteenth century, states have steadily
bolstered their governors' veto powers. Indeed, many governors now en-
absolute veto power in its constitution, but abolished it only two years later. New York's veto
was held by a multimember council. Id. at 145.
35. J. KALLENBACH, supra note 7, at 321.
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (A. Hamilton).
37. Id. No. 48 (J. Madison).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
39. H. BLACK, THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER TO LEGISLATION 151
(1919).
The most portentous development in American political and constitutional history
since 1865, is the change in the relations between the executive and legislative
branches of government, the one making enormous gains in the direction of influence
and actual power, the other suffering a corresponding decline in prestige and in its
control over the processes of government.
Id. at 1.
40. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 201
(1983). Williams asserts that two phenomena illustrate the trend toward increasing limitations
on legislative power:
(1) the insertion of specific "constitutional legislation" into state constitutional text,
thereby supplanting legislative prerogatives and sometimes leading to a limitation on
legislative alternatives through judicially discovered "negative implication"; and (2)
the insertion into state constitutions of detailed procedural requirements that the
legislature must follow in the enactment of statutory law.
Id. at 201-02 (footnotes omitted). Among the "procedural requirements" referred to by Wil-
liams is the one-subject rule. Id. at 203.
41. Prescott, supra note 7, at 97-99. The means by which the states accomplished this
transition from a weak to a strong executive varied. Some constitutional provisions were
changed by convention, some by initiative or referendum. Williams, supra note 40, at 205.
States continue to revise their constitutions through these means, often establishing constitu-
tional revision commissions before making changes. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Func-
tion and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928, 928-29 (1968).
Professor Fairlie notes that no state conferred a veto power on its governor between 1793
and 1812, and he attributes this to the rise of the Jeffersonian Republicans, who did not sup-
port a strong executive. Since 1812, all new states but West Virginia have given their gover-
nors a veto. According to Fairlie, the reason for this change may be that Congress had given
the territorial governors this power, and the states merely adopted the familiar territorial form
of government. Fairlie, supra note 7, at 476-77.
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joy stronger legislative disapproval capabilities than the President.42 In
some states, for example, a governor has more time than the President to
consider legislation, and in a few cases the governor has the option of
returning the bill with suggestions for amendments that the legislature
must consider prior to- repassage.43 Nevertheless, the general rule re-
mains that a governor must accept or reject a bill in its entirety.44 If the
governor attempts to disapprove a portion of a bill in violation of this
rule, the veto has no effect, and the bill passes into law.45
(2) The Item Veto
The primary exception to the general rule, and it is a significant one,
is the item veto. The item veto allows the governor to delete segments
from appropriation bills. Beyond this, generalizations about the opera-
tion of this power are difficult because states vary considerably in both
the constitutional language authorizing a partial veto and judicial inter-
pretations of such provisions. However, a few observations can be made
to illustrate the differing philosophies toward partial veto power.
The framers of the United States Constitution apparently gave little
thought to enabling the executive to veto less than a whole bill, simply
because in their experience bills were brief and straightforward.46 By the
time of the Civil War, however, logrolling and the use of riders in Con-
gress demonstrated the need for an expanded disapproval power. Recog-
nizing this need, the Confederacy included an item veto in its con-
stitution.47 The states also experienced veto-proofing measures and, after
the Civil War, began incorporating partial veto provisions into their con-
stitutions. Southern states were the first to adopt item vetoes, but the use
of such vetoes had spread to many northern states by the early twentieth
century. Notably, this trend corresponded closely with the increasing
popularity of the one-subject rule.48
42. J. KALLENBACH, supra note 7, at 321-22.
43. See id. at 365; R. LUCE, PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 168; Prescott, supra note 7, at
98. This latter variation is sometimes called an "amendatory veto." J. KALLENBACH, supra
note 7, at 365. This divergence in the state experience from that of the federal system counsels
against looking to federal decisions in evaluating the scope of the gubernatorial veto power.
44. See, e.g., California Mfrs. Ass'n v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 24 Cal. 3d 836, 847, 598
P.2d 836, 843, 157 Cal. Rptr. 676, 683 (1979); Lukens v. Nye, 156 Cal. 498, 503, 105 P. 593,
595 (1909); Patterson v. Dempsey, 152 Conn. 431, 441, 207 A.2d 739, 744 (1965); Opinion of
the Justices, 58 Del. 475, 479, 210 A.2d 852, 855 (1965); State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa State
Highway Comm'n, 186 N.W.2d 141, 151 (Iowa 1971); Wood v. State Admin. Bd., 255 Mich.
220, 224, 238 N.W. 16, 17-18 (1931).
45. Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 25 Ariz. 381, 218 P. 139 (1923);
Lukens v. Nye, 156 Cal. 498, 105 P. 593 (1909).
46. R. LUCE, PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 185; see also Zinn, The Veto Power of the
President, 12 F.R.D. 209 (1951).
47. R. LUCE, PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 185.
48. Id.
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Today, forty-two states provide the governor with the option of
striking portions of budget bills.49 One state, Washington, does not limit
the partial veto to appropriation acts, but allows the executive to delete
separate sections from any bill.:50 Other states with item vetoes fall into
two categories. The first restricts the veto to whole items of appropria-
tion, and the second permits either a "reduction" in an appropriation or
the deletion of "part" of an appropriation or bill.51 Whatever differences
exist concerning the scope of the item veto, the jurisdictions agree on the
purpose of the item veto: like the one-subject rule, its purpose is to pre-
vent riders and logrolling.
52
II. Judicial Application
The one-subject rule and the item veto represent two sides of the
same phenomenon: the replacement of fear of the executive branch with
hostility toward the legislature. More specifically, both are designed to
prevent legislative circumvention of the gubernatorial veto power by
means of logrolling and riders. This section shows that any failure of
these provisions to curb undesirable legislative practices is not due to
shortcomings of the provisions themselves, but rather to judicial unwill-
ingness to apply them with an eye toward furthering this fundamental
purpose.
A. The One-Subject Rule
Litigants have repeatedly called upon the courts to decide just what
constitutes a single "subject" within the meaning of the one-subject rule.
In keeping with the tradition of judicial deference to the legislature,
courts have given the word a very broad construction. While most chal-
lenges under the one-subject rule have therefore failed,53 examples of de-
cisions invalidating multisubject legislation are not difficult to find.
5 4
49. Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
and Vermont have no item veto provision.
50. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12 (1966); see State ex rel. Ruoff v. Rosellini, 55 Wash. 2d
554, 556, 348 P.2d 971, 972 (1960) (confirming that art. III, § 12 allows the veto of any section
of a bill).
51. Harrington, The Propriety of the Negative-The Governor's Partial Veto Authority, 60
MARQ. L. REv. 865, 873-74 (1977).
52. Fairfield v. Foster, 25 Ariz. 146, 153, 214 P. 319, 322 (1923); Green v. Rawls, 122 So.
2d 10, 14 (Fla. 1960); Opinion of the Justices, 384 Mass. 820, 425 N.E.2d 750 (1981); State ex
rel. Teachers & Officers v. Holder, 76 Miss. 158, 163, 23 So. 643, 647 (1898); State ex rel.
Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 442, 444-45, 289 N.W. 662, 664 (1940).
53. See Ruud, supra note 4, at 394.
54. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Swoap, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1187, 1201, 219
Cal. Rptr. 664, 667 (1985); State v. Lee, 356 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1978); AFL v. Langley, 66 Idaho
763, 168 P.2d 831 (1946); Michaels v. Hill, 328 II1. 11, 159 N.E. 278 (1927); State ex rel.
Stephan v. Carlin, 229 Kan. 665, 630 P.2d 709 (1981); Johnson v. Greiner, 44 N.M. 230, 101
P.2d 183 (1940); Barde v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 470, 584 P.2d 390 (1978). Indeed, the drafters of
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Although the terminology differs slightly, nearly all courts apply
some form of the "germaneness" test in determining whether a law con-
tains multiple subjects: if all of the law's provisions are germane to one
general subject or object, the legislation satisfies the one-subject rule.55
Although courts have often applied this test permissively, finding its re-
quirement satisfied by a very broad subject, the seminal California case of
Evans v. Superior Court 56 suggested a limiting principle. In Evans, the
challenged act completely revised California probate law and combined it
in a single code. The measure contained 1700 sections dealing with all
aspects of probate. In upholding the act, the court said:
Numerous provisions, having one general object, if fairly indicated in
the title, may be united in one act. Provisions governing projects so
related and interdependent as to constitute a single scheme may be
properly included within a single act. The legislature may insert in a
single act all legislation germane to the general subject as expressed in
its title and within the field of legislation suggested thereby.
57
The Evans court's language concerning "interdependent" provisions
is especially noteworthy. Requiring interdependence of provisions would
give conceptual substance to the extremely slippery germaneness test by
taking the analysis out of circular definitions of "subject." Justice Wiley
Manuel, dissenting in Schmitz v. Younger,58 argued for a test similar to
the Evans interdependence approach for determining whether initiatives
violate the one-subject rule.59 Justice Manuel proposed that "provisions
must be functionally related in furtherance of a common underlying pur-
pose."' 60 In Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State
Board of Equalization,61 the California Supreme Court acknowledged
Justice Manuel's test, calling it "more restrictive" than the germaneness
the Model State Constitution contend that the courts have used the one-subject rule as the
basis for a series of "highly technical invalidations." See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
But see Ruud, supra note 4, at 447 (courts only infrequently invalidate legislation as
multisubject).
55. See, e.g., Shaw v. State, 8 Ariz. App. 447, 452, 447 P.2d 262, 267 (1968); State v.
Hruska, 219 Kan. 233, 243-44, 547 P.2d 732, 740-41 (1976); State ex rel. Dowling v. Sill, 310
Mich. 570, 574-75, 17 N.W.2d 756, 758 (1945); Barde v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 470, 472, 584 P.2d
390, 391 (1978).
56. 215 Cal. 58, 8 P.2d 467 (1932).
57. Id. at 62-63, 8 P.2d at 469 (citations omitted).
58. 21 Cal. 3d 90, 577 P.2d 652, 145 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1978).
59. The initiative one-subject rule was adopted in California in 1948. CAL. CONST. art.
II, § 8(d). California courts have treated the initiative one-subject rule the same as the legisla-
tive one-subject rule. See Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87, 207 P.2d 47 (1949). For a full
discussion of the one-subject rule for initiatives, see Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the
Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REv. 936 (1983).
60. Schmitz, 21 Cal. 3d at 100, 577 P.2d at 656, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23 (Manuel, J.,
dissenting). Justice Manuel urged that "the special nature of the initiative process requires a
narrower construction of the word 'subject.'" Id. at 99, 577 P.2d at 657, 145 Cal. Rptr. at
522.
61. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
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test, but avoided deciding whether it was controlling by finding that the
measure under scrutiny satisfied both the "functionally related" and ger-
inaneness tests.
62
In 1982, however, the California Supreme Court eliminated the in-
terdependence aspect of the Evans test. In Brosnahan v. Brown,63 Propo-
sition 8 of the June 1982 primary election-popularly known as the
"Victims' Bill of Rights"-was challenged as a violation of California's
one-subject rule for initiatives.64 Proposition 8 contained measures rang-
ing from victim restitution 65 to changes in the rules of evidence. 66 The
court rejected the argument that the different sections of the initiative
were not "interdependent," stating that "[n]o preceding case has ever
suggested that such interdependence is a constitutional prerequisite....
In context, it is obvious that Evans' reference to interdependence merely
illustrated one type of multifaceted legislation which would meet the sin-
gle subject test."67 Thus, the Brosnahan court eliminated the core of the
Evans test by characterizing it as simply an example of permissible legis-
lation. The court justified this interpretation by pointing out that the
Evans opinion provided that interdependent provisions may be joined in
a single act. 68 This interpretation simply ignored the obvious implication
of the Evans holding that provisions not interdependent may not be in-
cluded in one bill.
In place of the Evans test, the Brosnahan court held that enactments
will meet the one-subject requirement when they "fairly disclose a rea-
sonable and common sense relationship among their various components
in furtherance of a common purpose. ' 69 The court begged the question
of when a "common purpose" is impermissibly broad, except to say that
"the rule obviously forbids joining disparate provisions which appear
germane only to topics of excessive generality such as 'government' or
'public welfare.' ",70
The Brosnahan test offers little guidance to legislators or litigators in
62. Id. at 230, 583 P.2d at 1290, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
63. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
64. Id. at 247, 651 P.2d at 280, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 36. Proposition 8 was a modification of
the state constitution, rather than statutory legislation, but this distinction played no part in
the court's analysis.
65. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b).
66. Id. § 28(f).
67. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 248-49, 651 P.2d at 281, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (emphasis in
original).
68. Id. at 248-50, 651 P.2d at 281, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
69. Id. at 253, 651 P.2d at 284, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
70. Id. In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Bird argued that the majority, in rejecting
interdependence, had abruptly departed from precedent. Id. at 269-71, 651 P.2d at 294-95,
186 Cal. Rptr. at 50-51 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). She declined, however, to express an opinion
on whether the initiative one-subject rule is more restrictive than the legislative one-subject
rule. Id. at 271 n.8, 651 P.2d at 295 n.8, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 51 n.8.
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assessing when the line between distinct subjects has been crossed. Few
will be confident in predicting what constitutes a "common sense rela-
tionship" or when a subject is one of "excessive generality." Under the
Evans interdependence test or Justice Manuel's proposed "functionally
related" standard, legislation such as Proposition 8 would likely fail. 71
Although one might arguably characterize provisions concerning revised
evidence rules and restitution to crime victims as promoting the same
general object, they clearly operate independently. The effectiveness of
one has nothing to do with the operation of the other.
The judiciary's liberal reading of the one-subject rule is understand-
able, if not necessarily effective. Courts are traditionally and justifiably
hesitant to strike down legislation as unconstitutional. Moreover, they
are quite right in giving the one-subject rule a practical reading that will
not hamstring the legislature's attempts to enact legitimate though com-
plex legislation. However, the courts' failure to articulate a clear, pre-
dictable standard under the one-subject rule has led at least one
commentator to suggest that the requirement be eliminated. 72 Similarly,
the Model State Constitution proposes that the rule be excluded from
judicial review. 73 The drafters based this proposal on their belief that, in
applying the one-subject rule, the courts have pursued a course of
"highly technical invalidations. ' 74 The commentary to the Model State
Constitution recognizes that, absent judicial review, the gubernatorial
veto would become the primary means of enforcement:
In effect, this means that the legislature will have to police the single
subject rule in the first instance and, if abuses should occur, then the
governor's veto might be the proper remedy in response to public pres-
sure or on the basis of information received from the state legislature
itself. The unavailability of judicial review may encourage mischief
which would then have as its sole corrective the normal political
processes and a prompt governor's veto. 75
This proposal should be rejected for several reasons. First, the argu-
ment that the governor's existing veto power can effectively enforce the
rule is unpersuasive, because it is precisely this all-or-nothing veto that
frequently motivates violation of the rule. Crucial or desirable legislation
is often difficult, if not politically impossible, to veto. As the importance,
71. Evans, 215 Cal. at 62-63, 8 P.2d at 469; see Schmitz, 21 Cal. 3d at 100, 577 P.2d at
658, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (Manuel, J., dissenting) (standard would permit "complex but fo-
cused" legislation, while screening out an "amalgamation of unrelated provisions").
72. Schnader, The Constitution and the Legislature, 181 ANNALS 39, 41-42 (1935).
73. MODEL STATE CONST. art. IV, § 4.14 (1963). The final sentence of that section
reads: "Legislative compliance with the requirements of this section is a constitutional respon-
sibility not subject to judicial review." The section also omits the title requirement.
74. Id., commentary at 60.
75. Id. (emphasis added). The commentary apparently assumes that the governor would
have no choice but to disapprove the whole bill, rather than strike segments of it, but does not
preclude the latter possibility.
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urgency, or desirability of a bill increases, the likelihood that the legisla-
ture will attach riders to the bill in an effort to avoid the veto of less
popular measures is similarly enhanced. Thus, in those cases in which
the likelihood of violation is greatest, the governor is least likely to en-
force the one-subject rule by disapproving an entire bill. In the absence
of a subject-by-subject veto, the temptation to veto-proof measures in-
creases, yet the governor remains without a remedy.
Second, the Model Constitution's premise that courts have engaged
in a course of "highly technical invalidations" is inaccurate. As already
noted, the judiciary generally accords legislatures wide latitude in draft-
ing legislation. 76 In most of the cases considering the issue, the courts
have found that the legislature complied with the one-subject rule.
77
Only the most egregious violations result in invalidations. In short, judi-
cial invalidations under the one-subject rule have been neither frequent,
at least in comparison to the number of challenges, nor "highly
technical."
Finally, the Model Constitution's position that judicial review of the
one-subject rule is inappropriate is essentially based on disagreement
with the courts' treatment of the provision. By this reasoning, however,
any constitutional provision that, in the drafters' opinion, the judiciary
has not properly interpreted should be shielded from judicial review.
Even the Brosnahan "common sense relationship" test, however, is better
than no judicial review at all. By its very existence, judicial review is
likely to deter the legislative practices that the one-subject rule seeks to
prevent. "Normal political processes" obviously will not favor compli-
ance with the rule, since the legislature has no incentive-indeed a disin-
centive-to comply.
B. The Item Veto
When a particular exercise of the item veto is challenged, the con-
troversy typically centers on the two basic elements of an item of appro-
priation-the amount or money portion, and the instructions attached
to the funding. 78 Can the executive strike one and leave the other? The
answer depends in part on whether the relevant constitutional language
permits only the veto of distinct items, or whether it permits reductions
76. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
77. Professor Ruud suggests that the judicial interpretation of the rule is so liberal that it
has become a "weak and undependable arrow in [the advocate's] quiver." Ruud, supra note 4,
at 447.
78. See Jessen Assoc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1976). In California, the two
elements are described as the amount and the subject. Wood v. Riley, 192 Cal. 293, 304, 219
P. 966, 971 (1923). This characterization is somewhat misleading, however, because what the
Wood court called the "subject" often includes conditions or restrictions on the funding. Id. at
303-04, 219 P. at 972.
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or the elimination of "parts" of bills. Ultimately, however, the judiciary
determines the scope of the item veto.
(1) The Narrow Construction
The Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Rush v. Ray 7 9 is a recent
example of the strict approach to the item veto. The case arose after the
Iowa legislature enacted several appropriation measures and placed re-
strictions on the use of the money appropriated to prevent expenditures
for purposes other than those specified. These restrictions were to oper-
ate independently of a separate section of the Iowa Code which allowed
the governor to transfer appropriated funds from one state agency to an-
other.80 Governor Ray vetoed the restrictions, leaving the money provi-
sions intact. The Rush court framed the issue as "whether use of the
governor's item veto power to eliminate a provision in an appropriation
bill which prohibits the expenditure or transfer of appropriated funds
from one department of state government to another is proper."81
The majority purported to apply the "severability" test enunciated
in the court's earlier decisions. The severability test requires that a veto
be exercised only on an "item," defined as "something that may be taken
out of a bill without affecting its other purposes and provisions. It is
something that can be lifted bodily from it rather than cut out. No dam-
age can be done to the surrounding legislative tissue, nor should any scar
tissue result therefrom."' 82 The majority interpreted this severability test
to mean that "the governor's power is a negative one that does not allow
him to legislate by striking qualifications in a manner which distorts leg-
islative intent. '8 3 To strike a condition or restriction, said the court, the
governor must also disapprove the appropriation. Accordingly, the
court held that the language vetoed was an inseparable condition on the
appropriated funds and that the governor had used his power "affirma-
tively to create funds not authorized by the legislature. 8s4 Thus, the
Iowa Supreme Court invalidated the separate vetoes of an allocation of
money and restrictions on its expenditure.
The Rush court's approach was a mechanical application of prece-
dent. The language of the severability test is broad enough to allow the
veto of provisions not containing monetary amounts. In fact, this broad
language suggests a judicial concern over legislative incursions on the
79. 362 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1985). The relevant portion of the Iowa Constitution reads:
"The governor may approve appropriation bills in whole or in part and may disapprove any
item of an appropriation bill .... " IOWA CONST. art. III, § 16 (1857, amended 1968).
80. Rush, 362 N.W.2d at 483 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 8.39 (West Supp. 1986)).
81. Id. at 480.
82. Id. at 481 (quoting Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 290, 11 S.E.2d 120, 124
(1940)).
83. Id. at 482.
84. Id.
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gubernatorial general veto power through the use of amendments to ap-
propriation bills. By phrasing the test in general terms-terms applicable
outside the context of appropriation legislation-the Iowa courts de-
scribed an item veto with a scope broad enough, at least potentially, to
disapprove legislation not containing an allocation of funds. If a provi-
sion were sufficiently distinct from other provisions in the bill, it would
be subject to veto whether or not it could be properly characterized as an
appropriation. In other words, the test authorized the governor to
thwart legislative efforts to append substantive legislation to appropria-
tion bills.85
The Rush court, however, effectively held that virtually any measure
framed as a restriction on appropriated funds is inextricably linked to
those funds. Instead of inquiring whether the restriction constituted gen-
eral legislation attached to a budget bill, the Rush majority focused on
whether the governor had "distorted" the legislative intent.86 Such an
approach is disingenuous. Clearly, any exercise of the item veto is, to an
extent, a distortion of legislative intent. Even under a restrictive stan-
dard, the governor need not disapprove the whole appropriation act, and
the final product may bear little resemblance to the document delivered
to the governor's desk by the legislature.
The three dissenting justices pointed out that the line between an
"item," which is subject to veto, and a "proviso or condition," which is
not, is indistinct, but that regardless of how blurred the line may be, it is
crossed when the language in question is so unrelated to the rest of the
bill that it violates the one-subject rule.8 7 In addition, the dissent recog-
nized the practical nature of the problem:
If a provision is attached to an appropriation in violation of the single
subject provision the whole act could be challenged as void. But a gov-
ernor is usually in a poor position to ask for an appropriation bill to be
declared void .... Legislation attached by means of proviso or condi-
tion labels to crucial appropriation bills might thus become impervious
to veto. The upshot was a liberal interpretation of an item .... 8
The Rush dissent placed the focus in the appropriate place: the sep-
aration of powers. It recognized that, while the technical issue was
whether the governor had validly exercised the item veto, the true dis-
pute concerned the power of the legislature to neutralize the governor's
general veto. Since a separate statute gave the governor the authority to
transfer funds within the government, and a separate bill attempting to
withdraw that authority would be subject to executive veto, the dissent-
85. Conceptually, the severability test is strikingly similar to the Evans interdependence
test. See supra text accompanying notes 56-62. Both tests focus the inquiry on whether the
various provisions included in a bill are interrelated.
86. Rush, 362 N.W.2d at 482.
87. Id. at 484 (Harris, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Harris, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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ers believed that "the governor should not be robbed of this veto power
by the simple process of attaching the repeal or suspension of this ex-
isting statute to an appropriation bill." 89 The dissent thus highlighted
two fundamental aspects of the dispute over whether courts should read
the partial veto power broadly or narrowly. First, there is no easy way to
define an item as opposed to an inseparable condition. Second, as a prac-
tical matter, the one-subject rule does not protect the governor's veto.
Nevertheless, the dissent emphasized the relationship between the veto
and the one-subject rule and observed that the one-subject rule can assist
courts in determining whether a veto is valid.
(2) The Broad Construction
Only months after Rush, the Iowa Supreme Court appeared to
adopt the dissenters' point of view, offering an example of an expansive
reading of the veto power. In Colton v. Branstad,90 the court again ad-
dressed the question of whether the separate veto of a restriction on cer-
tain appropriated funds was valid. The legislature had appropriated
over one million dollars to a state agency, but conditioned the money on
relinquishment of that agency's federal funding to specified local organi-
zations. The governor vetoed the condition, but left the money provision
intact.
Chief Justice Reynoldson, who had joined the dissent in Rush, wrote
the majority opinion upholding the veto. The Chief Justice attempted to
reconcile the decision with Rush, finding the veto valid because the provi-
sion at issue, unlike that in Rush, did not "limit or direct the use of the
appropriation." 91 In other words, the qualification on the funds did not
specify how they should be spent, but rather created a prerequisite for
their expenditure. Instead of a condition, which could not be vetoed
under Rush, the provision was a "contingency," which was subject to
veto because it had no "direct or immediate relationship" to the purpose
of the funds.92 The attenuated connection between the money and the
contingency permitted independent veto of each. Chief Justice Reynold-
son established a "sufficient relationship" test to determine the validity of
an exercise of the item veto. Under this test, if the court finds that the
vetoed measure is an "unrelated substantive piece of legislation"-that is,
a rider-it will uphold the veto.93 Thus, a provision may be vetoed be-
89. Id. at 485 (Harris, J., dissenting).
90. 372 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1985).
91. Id. at 189.
92. Id. at 190.
93. Id. at 191-92. At the end of the opinion, the court noted that the tests for determin-
ing whether a provision may be item-vetoed and whether it meets the requirements of the one-
subject rule are not the same. A bill may contain only one subject, yet some of its provisions
may be sufficiently unrelated to the rest of the act to be subject to the item veto. "It seems
apparent that the item veto amendment, adopted 111 years after the 'one bill-one subject'
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cause it is general rather than appropriation legislation. Accordingly, the
governor may separately veto funding restrictions if those restrictions are
sufficiently unrelated to the purpose of the funding itself.
Colton was an improvement over Rush to the extent that the holding
prevented the legislature's use of an appropriation bill as a vehicle for
general legislation. But, the court's effort to reconcile its opinion with
Rush weakened the holding. This hedging forced the court to create a
dubious distinction between "conditions" and "contingencies," adding
an element of confusion to the decision.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has been more straightforward in ex-
plaining its broad view of the item veto. In Henry v. Edwards, 94 which
was quoted at length in Colton, 95 the court read the state's item-veto pro-
vision in conjunction with a corollary to the one-subject rule, common
among the states,96 prohibiting the inclusion of general legislation in ap-
propriation bills.97 Although the court defined an item as a "sum of
money dedicated to a specific purpose,"9 it nevertheless permitted the
governor's veto of segments that did not include sums of money. The
executive cannot disapprove "conditions or limitations legitimately in-
cluded in an appropriation bill" without deleting the money allocation
attached to those conditions or limitations.99 However, if the legislature
attempts to "veto-proof" general legislation by phrasing it as a condition
to an appropriation, violating the state constitution in the process, the
governor may properly excise this "condition." Such a rule is necessary,
said the court, to preserve the proper balance between the legislative and
executive branches:
Just as the Governor may not use his item-veto power to usurp
constitutional powers conferred on the legislature, neither can the leg-
islature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred
on him as the chief executive officer of the state by including in a gen-
eral appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in separate legis-
lation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general
legislation cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such meas-
ures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to
constitutional provision, was designed to achieve a goal that could not be reached through the
prior provision." Id. at 192. This conclusion seems correct, but it does not affect the point
made in the Rush dissent that the one-subject rule may offer assistance in determining when a
veto is valid.
94. 346 So. 2d 153 (La. 1977).
95. 372 N.W.2d at 190-91.
96. E.g., ARiz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 20; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 32; ILL. CONsT. art.
IV, § 8(d). Normally these provisions are used by states that exempt budget bills from the one-
subject rule.
97. "The general appropriation bill shall be itemized and shall contain only appropria-
tions for the ordinary expenses of government, public charities, pensions, and the public debt
or interest thereon." LA. CONST. art. III, § 16(C).
98. Henry, 346 So. 2d at 157.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
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choose between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or veto-
ing "items" of expenditure essential to the operation of government
.... In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature
inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such pro-
visions must be treated as "items" for purposes of the Governor's item
veto power over general appropriation bills.
... [L]egislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as
to encumber the general appropriation bill with veto-proof "logrolling
measures," special interest provisions which could not succeed if sepa-
rately enacted, or "riders," substantive pieces of legislation incorpo-
rated in a bill to insure passage without veto. 1°°
Two premises are implicit in the Henry opinion. First, the mere
existence of a prohibition on attaching general legislation to an appropri-
ation bill does not prevent the legislature from engaging in that practice.
Were this not true, the litigation would not have arisen; the governor
could have exercised the item veto as envisioned by the authors of the
one-subject rule. Second, the initial method of enforcing the ban on the
inclusion of substantive legislation in appropriation bills should be the
gubernatorial veto power.
The Henry court explicitly recognized that both the item veto and
the rules restricting the content of legislation represent efforts to curb
logrolling and riders. Therefore, the court applied the same test to each:
a measure violating the spirit of the one-subject rule is vulnerable to the
governor's veto. Despite the court's reliance on the item veto, it plainly
was protecting the governor's general veto power.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's use of the constitutional
restriction on appropriation bills to protect the governor's veto power.
Admitting that the decision might strike a "workable compromise of a
troublesome conflict between our co-equal branches of government," 101
the dissenting justice nevertheless believed that the court had altered the
balance between the chief executive and legislature without the people's
consent. He further suggested that the court had surrendered to the gov-
ernor its function of declaring legislation unconstitutional. 102
California's judiciary has also enhanced the general veto through an
expansive reading of the item veto. 103 The comparatively broad scope of
the California governor's power to disapprove items of appropriation was
established in two early cases. Wood v. Riley 104 and Reardon v. Riley'0 5
100. Id. at 157-58 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
101. Id. at 166 (Dennis, J., concurring and dissenting).
102. Id.
103. California's constitution allows the reduction as well as deletion of items of appropri-
ation: "The Governor may reduce or eliminate one or more items of appropriation while
approving other portions of a bill ...." CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(b).
104. 192 Cal. 293, 219 P. 966 (1923).
105. 10 Cal. 2d 531, 76 P.2d 101 (1938).
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each upheld the exercise of the item veto even though the governor did
not delete all of the funding corresponding to the vetoed instructions.
Wood involved the familiar pattern of the attachment of a substan-
tive restriction 10 6 to an item of appropriation, followed by the governor's
veto of that restriction. The legislature had conditioned its appropriation
of funds for state teachers' colleges on the "administrative allotment" of
one percent of those funds to the State Department of Education. The
governor vetoed the restriction, but did not reduce the appropriation.1
0 7
After reviewing other state courts' interpretations of the item veto
power,108 the Wood court found that the restriction was in fact an appro-
priation subject to executive disapproval. The court reasoned that, be-
cause the governor did not recommend a Department of Education
appropriation or include one in his proposed budget bill, the legislature
enacted such an appropriation "under the guise of an administrative al-
lotment," 0 9 apparently to prevent the governor's elimination of that
measure. According to the court, invalidating the veto would allow the
legislature to accomplish indirectly what it was prohibited from doing
directly.110 Evidently this remark referred to the veto-proofing of legisla-
tion. What makes the case significant, however, is the court's failure to
require a one percent reduction in the overall appropriation.I The legis-
lature had disguised an item of appropriation as an allotment, yet the
governor was permitted to veto the purpose of the funding without elimi-
nating the funding itself."12
The facts in Reardon were very similar to those in Wood, and the
court reached the same conclusion. The legislature had appropriated
over $1.6 million to the Department of Industrial Relations, with special
instructions for the expenditure of $348,000 of that amount. The gover-
nor vetoed the two "items" directing the use of the $348,000 subap-
propriation, but he reduced the overall appropriation by only
$228,000.'
13
The state controller refused to release the $120,000 difference. He
106. The court called the restriction a "proviso." Wood, 192 Cal. at 296, 219 P. at 968.
107. Id. at 306, 219 P. at 972.
108. One case is particularly worthy of note. Callaghan v. Boyce, 17 Ariz. 433, 458, 153
P. 773, 782 (1915), stated that "'item' . . . is used synonymously with 'subject."'
109. Wood, 192 Cal. at 305, 219 P. at 971.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 306, 219 P. at 972.
112. In response to the petitioner's argument that the governor's veto of the restriction
required a one percent reduction in the overall appropriation, the court said:
What may or may not have been the effect of the Governor's veto of the appropria-
tion made by the proviso on other portions of the act does not concern the court at
this time. The point of this decision is that the legislature attempted to make an
appropriation ... in such a way as to circumvent the veto power of the Governor.
Id.
113. Reardon, 10 Cal. 2d at 533-34, 76 P.2d at 102.
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argued that, by striking the provisions allocating $348,000, the governor
effectively reduced the funds appropriated to the Department of Indus-
trial Relations by the same amount. 114 Citing Wood, the court rejected
the controller's argument and permitted the governor's veto to stand as it
was originally exercised." 5 Again, the court allowed the governor to dis-
approve the instructions attached to funding separately from the money
actually appropriated.
Unlike Wood, Colton, and Henry, however, Reardon was not based
on the premise that the legislature cannot curtail the governor's general
veto power by means of artfully drafted legislation. Rather, the court
based its holding on its characterization of "legislative intent." "[W]e
conclude that it was the original legislative intent to appropriate
$1,625,185 to the department regardless of the subsequent fate of the spe-
cific and included items of further appropriation .... 116 Thus, the
court used a rationale most often associated with restrictive readings of
the item-veto power to justify an expansive view of that executive prerog-
ative. The fallacy of this reasoning has already been pointed out.
117
Thirty-eight years have passed since the California Supreme Court
last examined the scope of the gubernatorial veto power in Reardon.
However, the court will have the opportunity to address the issue again
during its current term in Harbor v. Deukme/ian. 18 In Harbor, the inter-
mediate appellate court upheld the governor's veto of a part of a nonap-
propriation bill, and the supreme court has granted review. The case
arose after the legislature had passed a budget bill containing an appro-
priation of over $1.5 billion for the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program (AFDC). In section 45.5 of a separately enacted
"budget implementation bill," the legislature changed the starting date
for AFDC payments from the date of eligibility to the date of applica-
tion. The Assembly-Senate Conference Committee estimated the cost of
the change at $9,776,000. Governor Deukmejian reduced the overall
AFDC appropriation by this amount and vetoed section 45.5 of the
budget implementation bill.
Petitioner Harbor, an AFDC applicant, did not question the gover-
nor's ability to reduce the AFDC appropriation. Petitioner did, how-
ever, argue that the governor could not properly veto part of the budget
implementation bill. In its amicus brief, the California Legislature main-
tained that the bill contained no items of appropriation and therefore
114. Id. at 535, 76 P.2d at 103.
115. Id. at 537, 76 P.2d at 104.
116. Id. at 536, 76 P.2d at 103.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
118. 176 Cal. App. 3d 813, 222 Cal. Rptr. 382, review granted, Apr. 3, 1986 (S.F. 24837),
reprinted without change to permit tracking pending review, 185 Cal. App. 3d 299 (1986). For a
discussion of the significance of California's depublication procedure, see Grodin, The Depubli-
cation Practice of the California Supreme Court, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 514 (1984).
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could be vetoed only in its entirety. 119 Respondent Deukmejian con-
tended that his veto was valid "either as an 'item veto' of an appropria-
tion or as a remedy for the Legislature's violation of the 'one subject'
rule."' 120 The court upheld the validity of the governor's action as a
proper exercise of the item veto and therefore declined to address the
one-subject issue.
121
The court first reviewed Wood and Reardon, but noted that the Har-
bor facts differed from those earlier cases in two respects. In Harbor,
"(1) subject and amount are in two different bills, and (2) the budget bill
does not contain a line item appropriation for the subject vetoed."'1
22
The court deemed the first distinction "of minor importance. It cannot
be argued seriously that the Legislature could negate the item veto by
merely separating amount from subject and demanding an all-or-nothing
veto of the bill containing the statement of the subject."'
23
The second distinction presented more difficulty. The item con-
tained in the budget bill appeared to be discrete. It contained both ele-
ments of an item of appropriation: the amount was $1.5 billion and the
instructions were to spend the money on AFDC. By reducing the
amount and striking the substantive change in the AFDC program con-
tained in a separate bill, the governor "purported to divide the appropria-
tion into smaller amounts and identify the subject matter of one such
smaller amount." The Harbor court candidly acknowledged that it
"found no precedent authorizing his dividing that amount into its com-
ponent parts and using the line item veto to eliminate discrete activities
financed under the AFDC lump sum appropriation." Yet the court per-
mitted this use of the item veto, emphasizing that when the legislature
enacted section 45.5 of the budget implementation bill, it "left clear evi-
dence of how much it expected those adjustments to cost."'1 24 In effect,
the court allowed the governor to imply an item not created by the legis-
lature. 25 Once the item was implied, it could be vetoed.
The reasoning of the Harbor opinion suffers from two defects. First,
section 45.5 of the budget implementation act was not part of an appro-
priation. It was clearly substantive legislation because it did not merely
provide instructions for the expenditure of money but conferred a statu-
119. Brief of Legislature, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Petitioners at 5, 9, Harbor (No.
24837).
120. Harbor, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 300, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
121. Id. at 305 n.3, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 387 n.3. The budget implementation bill in fact
contained provisions concerning subjects ranging from the escheat of property to the adminis-
tration of tuberculosis tests to the reallocation of space within the State Capitol Building. S.B.
1379, 68th Leg., 2d Sess. (1984).
122. Harbor, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 304, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
123. Id. at 304-05, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (footnote omitted).
124. Id.
125. "Change in the beginning date of aid was the subject, and $9,776,000 was the amount
. . Id.
March 1987] ONE-SUBJECT RULE
tory entitlement on certain needy families. The change in the AFDC
starting date was a policy judgment not necessarily dependent on how
much funding was appropriated to the program in general. 26 Undoubt-
edly the legislature could have enacted section 45.5-or changed any
other aspect of the AFDC program-in a bill entirely unconnected with
the budget act.
The second-and more significant-defect in the Harbor opinion is
that it provides virtually no guidance for determining what future cir-
cumstances will justify the partial veto of a nonappropriation bill. By
relying on the legislature's cost estimate in section 45.5, the court may
have been limiting the decision to its facts, but it does not explain its
reasons for doing so. The dissent pointed out several important ques-
tions left open by this reliance on the legislative estimate
Does this mean the Governor may veto substantive legislation only
when the Legislature has expressly stated the cost of legislation? What
may a Governor do the next time if the Legislature only leaves hints
about the cost of the program? Or the time after that if no hints are
left but a Governor's staff is able to estimate the cost of the legislative
change? 127
If the case is limited to those situations in which the legislature is explicit
about how much the legislation will cost, a legislature intent on circum-
venting the veto power will certainly be careful to leave no such evidence.
If it is not limited to those situations, the governor's power to partially
veto substantive legislation has no identifiable limitation.
The court may have wanted to limit this use of the veto to the
budget implementation bill: "We conclude that the budget bill and the
budget implementation bill are so intimately related that when the Gov-
ernor vetoes a part of the latter to conform with a reduction in the for-
mer, he or she vetoes an 'item of appropriation.' ",128 As a limitation,
however, this statement cuts both ways. Although it may provide a
check on the item veto, the conclusion that the two bills are "intimately
related" would seem to allow the governor to veto virtually any portion
126. The new starting date increased the cost of the AFDC program, but the legislature
was under no obligation to increase funding proportionately. If the funds proved insufficient,
the result would simply be a cessation or reduction of payments actually made, or a later
increase in appropriation. No constitutional provision requires the legislature to find funds for
every cost-increasing piece of legislation it enacts.
In this respect, the Harbor court's reliance on the governor's reduction in the overall
AFDC appropriation gave an arbitrary preference to the veto of cost-increasing substantive
legislation. For example, suppose the legislature had passed a bill without reference to the
budget act that made AFDC eligibility requirements more restrictive, reducing the cost of the
program. If the governor vetoed this cost-reducing legislation, he would have no authority to
add funding to the AFDC appropriation in the budget act, since the item veto can only be
exercised to "reduce or eliminate" expenditures. CAL. CONST. art IV, § 10(b).
127. Harbor, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 306, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88 (White, P.J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
128. Id. at 305, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
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of the budget implementation bill, no matter how unrelated the provision
may be to the budget bill. On the other hand, the legislature could pro-
tect such a provision simply by placing it in another bill.
129
(3) Shortcomings of Judicial Application of the Item Veto
The literal interpretation of the item veto power in cases such as
Rush v. Ray 130 admittedly is more persuasive than the broader construc-
tion of similar constitutional provisions. The phrase "item of appropria-
tion" certainly connotes an allocation of money, not simply the
preconditions to spending the money. In this sense, the broad interpreta-
tion of the item veto seems strained. For instance, Henry v. Edwards first
defined an item as a "sum of money dedicated to a specific purpose,"
'131
then allowed the veto of provisions not containing sums of money. An-
other example is Harbor v. Deukmejian, 132 in which the court strained
but failed to provide a convincing rationale for the use of the item veto
on substantive legislation contained in a nonappropriation bill.
Despite the questionable reasoning of the broad construction cases,
the decisions nevertheless seem correct in the sense that they represent
barriers against legislative incursions on executive power. 133 These cases
seem both strained yet correct because, as the Henry court expressly
noted, they often use the item veto to protect the governor's power to
veto general legislation.
134
Use of the item-veto rationale weakens the effort to preserve the gen-
eral veto in two respects. First, the strained reasoning saps the persua-
sive power of the opinions. Second, and more important, protection for
the general veto is arbitrarily limited to the extent the item veto may be
exercised only on appropriation acts--or, in the Harbor case, budget im-
plementation bills. The legislature may still accomplish its impermissible
aim simply by attaching a rider to legislation unrelated to appropriations.
129. A further question left open by Harbor is how it relates to earlier cases. In Wood and
Reardon, the governor was permitted to veto separately the instructions element of the item.
Does that mean the governor might veto a section of the budget implementation bill without
deleting any of the corresponding funding?
130. 362 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1985); see supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
131. 346 So. 2d 153, 157 (La. 1977); see id. at 165 (Dennis, J., concurring and dissenting);
supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
132. 176 Cal. App. 3d 813, 222 Cal. Rptr. 382, review granted, Apr. 3, 1986 (S.F. 24837),
reprinted without change to permit tracking pending review, 185 Cal. App. 3d 299 (1986); see
supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
133. This aspect of the broad construction cases seems especially appropriate in light of
the continuing trend in the states to bolster executive power while limiting that of the legisla-
ture. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
134. Henry, 346 So. 2d at 157-58.
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III. Proposal: The Subject Veto
To preserve the positive aspects of the broad construction of the
item veto and to better, effect the purposes of the one-subject rule, this
Note proposes that the judiciary recognize a governor's power to exercise
a "subject veto" as a means of enforcing the constitutional restrictions on
the legislature. The subject veto would empower the governor to disap-
prove separately any "nongermane" portions of a bill. 135 Whatever test
the courts use to determine whether a bill contains only a single subject
would also determine whether the governor may exercise a "subject
veto." When a bill embraces several subjects, the governor would strike
as many or as few of those subjects as he or she chooses. The veto would
not extend to fragments of subjects, because this would be inconsistent
with the purpose of the one-subject rule. It therefore would not permit
deletion of individual words or phrases.13 6 The rule is not intended to
provide the governor with an unlimited partial veto power. It is, how-
ever, intended to stop veto-proofing, which the present system of exclu-
sively judicial enforcement is inadequate to prevent.
There are two primary reasons for the inadequacy of the present
system. First, the governor must make the crucial decision of whether to
sign or veto an enactment long before a court may hear a challenge. As
noted by the dissent in Rush v. Ray, the "governor is usually in a poor
position to ask for an appropriation bill to be declared void."'137 The
remark refers to appropriation bills, but it applies equally well to other
legislation. In most states, the governor has between three and fifteen
days to make a decision on a bill, and there simply is not enough time to
litigate a case prior to the deadline for gubernatorial action. 138 Conse-
quently, the legislature has that much more motivation to draft omnibus
legislation. If the governor vetoes the enactment, little is lost; the legisla-
ture may redraft it without the objectionable provisions, or divide it into
several bills. If the governor signs the bill, it might not be challenged. If
the bill is challenged, the courts may simply defer to the legislature.
The subject veto would resolve the dilemma presently posed for gov-
ernors considering whether to sign or veto an omnibus bill. A trip to the
135. Several commentators have argued that the President of the United States should
have exactly this type of veto power. See Clineburg, The Presidential Veto Power, 18 S.C.L.
REV. 732 (1962); Givens, The Validity of a Separate Veto of Nongermane Riders to Legislation,
39 TEMP. L.Q. 60 (1965); Note, supra note 2. But cf Note, supra note 26, at 735. The weak-
ness of this contention is that the federal government has accepted the system of logrolling and
riders. It has neither a one-subject rule nor an item veto.
136. Thus, the subject veto, like the item veto, would not be vulnerable to the frequently
quoted concern expressed in State v. Holder, 23 So. 643, 645 (Miss. 1898), that the governor's
veto must be limited to "a qualified and destructive legislative function, and [can] never [be] a
creative legislative power."
137. 362 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Iowa 1985) (Harris, J., dissenting).
138. See Prescott, supra note 7, at 99.
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courthouse would no longer be necessary to remedy the situation, be-
cause the problem could be solved with the governor's pen. One of the
evils at which the one-subject rule is aimed-veto-proofing-would be
eliminated.
The second problem with purely judicial enforcement of the single
subject rule is inefficiency. The governor, for political reasons or other-
wise, may not have the incentive to challenge every bill believed to con-
tain multiple subjects. Others with an interest in the legislation may not
have the resources to pursue litigation. Also, any potential litigants are
faced with the courts' ambiguous rulings concerning the definition of a
"subject," which make the results of litigation highly unpredictable. Un-
doubtedly, for all these reasons, many marginally multisubject enact-
ments are never brought to the judiciary's attention. In these cases, it is
as if the one-subject rule did not exist.
Gubernatorial enforcement of the one-subject rule would increase
efficiency in two ways. Instead of occasional, almost random, judicial
scrutiny of a few bills several years after their enactment, every piece of
legislation would be immediately evaluated for compliance with the rule.
In turn, the legislature, faced with little prospect for success, would be
much less likely to test the limits of the rule. The appeal of logrolling
and riders would be greatly diminished, because the legislature could no
longer be confident that omnibus legislation would go unchallenged.
One of the primary potential objections to a subject veto is the pros-
pect of gubernatorial abuse. Just as the legislative branch has not always
abided by the one-subject rule, the governor may well carve up a per-
fectly valid, unified enactment, invoking the subject veto as legal author-
ity. The short answer to this objection is that the judicial safety net
remains. No reason exists to believe that the governor will be more or
less inclined than the legislature to overstep the bounds of his or her
power. At present, when violations occur, the remedy lies in the courts.
The subject veto would not change this remedy; rather, it would only
shift the burden of litigating onto the legislature, or those who agree with
its actions. Although such a shift may at first glance seem arbitrary, it is
justified because the one-subject rule was intended as a burden on the
legislature. It was designed as a restriction on that body's power and,
simultaneously, as an enhancement of executive power.
In addition, the experience of the item veto provides some assurance
that gubernatorial abuse is unlikely to be a serious problem. As the item
veto cases indicate, the primary problem with respect to the item veto
has been less a matter of gubernatorial abuse than legislative circumven-
tion of the general veto.
Another possible objection to the subject veto is that voiced in the
Henry v. Edwards dissent. The dissent asserted that allowing the gover-
nor to assess whether a constitutional restriction on legislative power was
March 1987]
violated amounted to the delegation of a uniquely judicial function to the
executive. 39 This contention is without merit because the governor's
veto is subject to judicial review. Moreover, the governor has always
been permitted to disapprove legislation because of a belief that it is
unconstitutional.14
0
A third objection might be that the governor is unlikely to veto sub-
jects within a bill because it violates the one-subject rule. In other words,
if a bill containing five subjects comes before the governor, he or she may
well veto only one or two of those subjects, or none at all. Thus, despite
the subject veto a multisubject bill passes into law.
This objection amounts to a criticism already directed at judicial
enforcement of the one-subject rule: inefficiency. Admittedly, the exist-
ence of a subject veto power does not ensure that every multisubject bill
will die on the governor's desk. But the primary value of such a veto lies
in its deterrent effect. It removes a powerful incentive to draft multisub-
ject legislation, namely, veto-proofing.
What legal rationale can be offered in support of the subject veto?
One theory, proposed by at least three commentators addressing the
presidential veto, 141 contends that a "bill" and a "subject" are identical.
Under this theory, omnibus legislation would contain as many "bills" as
"subjects." Therefore, the requirement that the executive veto only an
entire bill would not prevent the deletion of several "bills" from an in-
strument containing more than one subject. This view has a certain ap-
peal in the federal context, because it is supported by the likelihood that
the framers of the United States Constitution did not anticipate that mul-
tiple subjects would be joined in a single enactment.1 42 Thus it is plausi-
ble that, to them, a bill and a subject were identical. In the states, a
supporting argument might be constructed from cases such as Wood and
Reardon, in which the court refused to accept the legislature's definition
139. 346 So. 2d 153, 166 (La. 1977) (Dennis, J., concurring and dissenting).
140. "The main purpose of the veto power as first established in this country after the
Revolution seems to have been to enable the executive to prevent action by the legislature in
violation of the constitution." Fairlie, supra note 7, at 491. One author contends that the issue
is unsettled, at least in the federal context. See Zinn, supra note 46, at 230-31.
141. See Clineburg, supra note 135, at 753; Givens, supra note 135 at 63; Zinn, supra note
46, at 241. Unlike Clineburg and Givens, Zinn recommends that Congress, rather than the
judiciary, declare that a bill and a subject are identical:
Such a definition would seem to be entirely in keeping with the intentions of the
founding fathers in establishing the veto power. The absence of such a definition
permits the Congress to circumvent the power which the Constitution provided for
him. If by their legislative action in incorporating several subject matters in one
instrument designated "a bill" the Congress may defeat or curtail the constitutional
power, surely by legislative action defining the term it may be preserved.
Id. Not surprisingly, Congress has declined to follow Zinn's advice.
142. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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of an "item." 143 Similarly, the courts might reject the legislative defini-
tion of a bill and redefine it as a subject.
This contention is fatally flawed, however, at least in the forty-one
states that have adopted the one-subject rule, because it would strip the
rule of all meaning. By definition, no bill could contain multiple subjects.
The fears of the dissenting justice in Henry would be realized-the judici-
ary could not conduct an independent review of legislation challenged as
multisubject. In those instances when both the legislature and the gover-
nor find that multisubject legislation promotes their interests, other par-
ties who might object to the joining of unrelated provisions would have
no recourse. The veto would become the only remedy for omnibus legis-
lation. Once a law was signed by the governor, it would be impervious to
this type of attack.
Of course, one might attempt to rehabilitate this theory by asserting
that the words "bill" or "statute," as they are used in the one-subject
rule, have two meanings. In the context of the gubernatorial veto, they
are synonymous with the word "subject." In the context of litigation
challenging compliance with the rule, they refer to a topic or idea. By
this tortured, dual construction of one word in a single provision, the
courts could simultaneously create a subject veto without eliminating
their own independent power to hear challenges to multisubject legisla-
tion. Precisely because this approach is so strained, however, it seems
disingenuous and unsatisfying.
A more appropriate and straightforward rationale for a subject veto
would not rely on semantics, but rather would rest on an interpretation
of the one-subject rule as it was intended to function in the context of the
states' overall legislative scheme. Obviously, an attempt to "find" a sub-
ject veto within the words of the one-subject rule would require judicial
sleight-of-hand just as clumsy as that displayed by the rationale equating
"bill" with "subject." None of the various formulations of the one-sub-
ject rule could justify implementation of a subject veto on the basis of
language alone. Instead, judicial implication of a subject veto should rest
on the history and purposes of the one-subject rule.
The history of the rule reveals that it is part of a deliberate shift in
the constitutional relationship between the legislative and executive
branches of government. It reflects an explicit rejection of the federal
system. Specifically, the one-subject rule represents an effort to allow the
executive to make a subject-by-subject assessment of whether enactments
should become law. While the rule is directed at the legislature, it pro-
vides a very precise perspective on the general veto power.
Several of the item-veto cases have recognized the close connection
between the purposes of the one-subject rule and the gubernatorial veto.
Together with some of the one-subject rule cases, they provide precedent
143. See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
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for the principle that the one-subject rule is intended to adjust the bal-
ance between legislative power to draft laws and executive power to dis-
approve them. In some cases, the courts effectively established, in the
name of the item veto, a subject veto applicable to appropriation bills.
Indeed, one might argue that the adoption of an explicit item veto,
especially when it occurred after the adoption of the one-subject rule,
represents the limit of the legislative-executive power readjustment. The
item veto, however, addresses concerns distinct from, albeit related to,
those underlying the one-subject rule. Accordingly, it is in some ways
broader, in other ways narrower, than the proposed subject veto. As a
device intended to provide the governor with greater control over the
budget process, the item veto does not restrict the governor to disap-
proval of measures that are nongermane to the rest of the bill. Regard-
less of whether a provision is an integral part of the legislature's budget
plan, if it fits the description of an "item," it is subject to disapproval.
On the other hand, this broad veto power, as a rule, is unique to appro-
priation bills. To the extent that the item veto has come to resemble a
subject veto, it is a matter of judicial attempts to protect the general
veto-protection more appropriately and effectively accomplished
through the vehicle of the one-subject rule.
Admittedly, judicial implementation of a subject veto would create a
gubernatorial power that, in most states, does not now exist. To some,
undoubtedly, it would be an example of excessive judicial activism. It
would not, however, be inconsistent with common-law principles. One
of the sounder rules of statutory construction, especially applicable in
constitutional interpretation, provides that, in interpreting laws, the
courts should apply each provision with an eye toward the others. The
instrument should be read as a 'vhole, and interrelated sections should be
applied in conformity with the overall scheme. 144 Application of this
principle to the one-subject rule and the general veto power supports ju-
dicial recognition of a subject veto. In short, the subject veto should be
seen as a variety of the general veto, justified by the history and purposes
of the one-subject rule.
Conclusion
At present, in all states but one,145 a governor faced with a multisub-
ject, nonappropriation bill cannot excise those subjects of which he or she
disapproves. Although the one-subject rule was designed to prevent this
situation, it occurs nevertheless. Unfortunately, judicial enforcement of
144. See Fields v. Fong Eu, 18 Cal. 3d 322, 329, 559 P.2d 729, 733, 134 Cal. Rptr. 367,
371 (1976); People v. Western Air Lines, 42 Cal. 2d 621, 637, 268 P.2d 723, 732, aff'd, 348
U.S. 859 (1954). See generally 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 1.02 (4th ed. 1984).
145. Washington allows partial veto of any bill. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12 (1966).
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the rule, by itself, does not meet the rule's objectives. While the item-
veto cases provide limited protection for the general veto power in appro-
priation bill cases, their rationale is unnecessarily restrictive and uncon-
vincing. Such cases are an attempt to enforce the one-subject rule with a
device ill suited to that end.
In Harbor v. Deukmejian, 146 a California appellate court ducked the
opportunity to recognize a subject veto. As a result, the decision dis-
torted the concept of the item veto, offering no clear rationale or stan-
dard for determining when the partial veto of a nonappropriation bill is
permissible. However, this question was left open, and the California
Supreme Court has granted review.
Initially, the subject veto may appear to be a dramatic expansion of
gubernatorial power. Upon closer examination, however, it becomes
clear that such a veto is merely a means of rendering the one-subject rule
self-executing. It makes little sense to create a constitutional provision
that ostensibly redistributes power within the branches of government,
but to enforce it so haphazardly that no genuine redistribution takes
place. The subject veto would provide the means to eliminate this anom-
aly and preserve the proper balance between the legislative and executive
branches of state government.
Jeffrey Gray Knowles*
146. 176 Cal. App. 3d 813, 222 Cal. Rptr. 382, review granted, (S.F. 24837), reprinted
without change to permit tracking pending review, 185 Cal. App. 3d 299 (1986); see supra notes
118-29 and accompanying text.
* Member, Third Year Class.
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